

# LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN DROUGHT DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT: BORANA PASTORALIST AREA, SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA

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## Abstract

Drought public disaster is one of the challenges tremendously hampering the development of Ethiopia. Ethiopian highest share of Growth Domestic Product (GDP) is coming from the agriculture sector and pastoralists. Ethiopian mode of production majorly depends on the rain. Drought is one of the most catastrophic natural disasters regarding the spatial extent, duration, and long-term socio-economic implication to pastoralists' livelihood. The objective of this paper is to assess the challenges of leadership in drought risk management. The research used qualitative analysis. Primary data gathered through a key informant interview. Fifteen (15) public managers have participated in key informant interviews. The study explored lack of strategizing and proactive planning, untimely response, lack of community mobilization and participation, loss of decentralization, inadequate coordination and integration of development, lack of communication, and dependency as challenges facing leadership in drought disaster risk management. The paper concludes that to transform pastoralists' livelihood and build drought-resilient pastoralists, leadership in the area requires understanding the challenges. Critically understanding public leadership challenges is imperative for drought intervention per the disaster risk reduction policy.

**Keywords:** Leadership, challenges, Drought, Disasters, Risk Management, Pastoralist, Borana, Ethiopia

## 1. Introduction

Solomon and his associates (2008) affirmed that drought impacts are prevalent in the Borana pastoralist area; besides, early warning disaster management is not well coordinated. The study also underlined that future researchers should pay attention to the coordination and leadership of drought disaster management in the pastoralist area. Marko (2012) emphasized that drought management in the pastoralist area not integrating the prevention and response with early warning of drought and development. On top of this, Desta and Coppock (2004) concluded that from 1980 to 2000, drought pressurized Borana pastoralists by causing a 37% loss of livestock inventory that could be hundreds of millions of USD. The study also underlined that future research should improve drought risk management in the pastoralist area.

Previous studies that have carried out in the Borana pastoralist area, such as Abarufa (2011), Jarso (2011), and Boku (2008), focused on impacts of drought in pastoralist livelihood, indigenous practises, and stress of pastoralists rather than viewing the issues from the perspective of leadership that are the main actors for managing drought

disaster in the pastoralist area. Furthermore, others researchers focus on rainfall variability (Angassa and Oba, 2007), bush encroachment controlling (Angassa & Oba, 2008), ecosystem management (Bassi and Tache, 2011). Thus, the studies that integrate drought disasters with leadership are scant.

Even though this issue has been a remaining concern of leadership in the area, drought contingency planning and early warning have not been coordinated well (Pantuliano & Wekessa, 2008). Disaster management committees of many woredas in the Borana pastoralist area are very weak in coordination and meet together only in emergency times as ad-hoc activities. In addition to this, droughts, such as mitigation, preparedness, and response, are ineffective, poorly coordinated, untimely, and centralized. In addition to this, great effort and resources were invested in emergencies after the immense livestock loss recorded (USAID, 2015).

Moreover, while the imminent occurrence of the drought is predicted, responses are not as expected. Thus, there is an immense loss of livestock, shortage of food, seasonal migration, and livelihood deterioration in the Borana pastoralist area (Mengistu, 2015).

Unless the problems of drought disaster management get solved soon, livestock mortality, vulnerability, and deterioration of livelihood, drought-induced mobility, and conflict continue in the Borana pastoralist area (Catley et al., 2014). Dealing with disaster emergency management such as drought requires leadership with certain qualities that identify challenges and uses the real opportunity to find the way out.

Further, without identifying the challenges of managing the crisis, emergency, and disaster such as drought, proper mitigation is terrible. As a result, this paper intended to bridge the literature gap and provide the serviceable body of knowledge for emergency managers, political leaders, nonprofit project managers, and policymakers that contribute to the mitigation of disastrous drought impacts on the socio-economic and livelihood of the community. This paper aims to assess leadership challenges in drought disaster risk management, Borana pastoralist in Ethiopia.

## **2.1 Leadership Challenges**

Kouzes and Posner (2002), in their study, indicated that leadership and challenges are inextricably linked. Leaders' people have high regard for being the one who has the audacity of their conviction. What is crucial to constituents is having leaders stand up for those beliefs during the intense challenge and radical change.

There is no call for leadership without challenging tasks; challenges make enormous demands on the people's qualities, abilities, and skills, and leadership always functions in a particular context. Leaders dwell in challenging situations within a given context. This circumstance's complication makes it hard to find the best style or approach that fits all conditions. In addition to this, Yukl (2006) also indicated that leadership is an essential concern that affects every organization, country, and religious movement's success and failure. The pace of change and complexity in contemporary business surroundings creates leadership increasingly demanding and placing unrealistic expectations on heroic leaders.

According to Pedler, Burgoyne, and Boydell (2010), leadership is chiefly worried about distinguishing, organizing, and taking action in the appearance of dangerous problems and matters. Consequently, leadership is identified by what communities do in the appearance of the challenges they face at home and work. Therefore, a performance art, measured on what we do in this state of affairs, here and now, and not what we are or what we know. Moreover, the leadership challenges depend on the task and the concentrated endeavor on leadership and less upon the individual. Leadership challenges in organizations and communities are usually communal ones, faced by all those in the circumstances. Even though individuals mark and move up challenges and do heroic hard work to determine them, few significant challenges are met by one person acting alone. Thus, the important call is to mobilize the people to connect colleagues, networks, communities, and whole organizations to meet and prevail over the challenges.

A research finding reveals that there are troubles and prospects of the day, which call for high-quality leadership. In addition to this, in realizing its leadership faces Twenty-one (21) key challenges divided into two zones. The first zone presented by the diagram as outer that comprises fourteen (14) key challenges is distinctive managerial challenges. We expected to face this challenge at work. Such as making a significant change, developing direction and strategy, creating a learning organization, new organizational structures, dominant teams, creating a culture of innovation, fostering diversity and inclusion, promoting partnerships, improving work processes, streamlining, encouraging social responsibility, mobilizing knowledge, leading in networks, and managing mergers. The inner zone of seven(7) core practices contains more personal inner challenges or practices about action-what to do (and need to do skillfully), such as living with risks, networking, facilitation, challenging questions, power, and purpose. However, it revolves around who is and how they are doing. The seven (7) core practices connect people to the outer organizational challenges through our actions. To sum up, it is the quality of responses to both inner and outer challenges that make the difference between sound quality and dreadful leadership (Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell, 2010).

## **2.2 Leadership and Disaster Management**

Issues of disaster management interlinked with leadership. Leadership has a prominent and influential role in society and influences life in ordinary and crises. Leadership is one key aspect of managing crises, emergencies, and disasters. Leading before, during, and after the disaster determines the strength of leadership. If the disaster is well managed, certain losses could be prevented or minimized (Demiroz and Kapucu, 2012).

According to Demiroz and Kapucu (2012), crisis and leadership are tangled, which means both notions have scenery to match one another. On top of this, leaders are responsible for taking action to the threats and uncertainties occlusion from crises. One most significant challenge of leaders during disasters brings things back to normal.

According to Boin and Hart (2003), crisis management is by no means being trouble-free. Organizational confusion, media demands, strain, and imprecise information are hardly any mechanisms that make it hard for crisis leadership to put together quality

decisions. Alterations in nature and the context of the contemporary crisis make these decisions almost intangible. The continuous threat of traditional contingencies, natural disasters, manufacturing accidents, violent political conflict, and public disorder was pressuring survivability.

Boin and Hart (2003) noted that numerous people are suspicious of crisis; simultaneously, the inexperienced about crisis details. People anticipate being safeguarded by their state; the idea that the whole crisis cannot be prohibited comes as an upset. That crisis is not exclusively the fault of exogenous forces does little to reconcile public frustration. The wearing away of community trust in government organizations' capacity to perform their classic custodian functions is accompanied by increasingly assertive and tenacious media coverage of risks, disasters, and other critical events. After the effects of today's disaster tend to be as influential and controversial as the acute crisis period are, with leaders put under pressure by streams of informal investigations, proactive journalism, insurance claims, and judicial (including criminal) proceeding against them. Leadership in the face of this sort of adversity is, in short, precarious. In addition to this, political and bureaucratic leaders have a hard time coming to terms with the crisis's open-ended duration, particularly when they seek crisis closure where none is possible.

At the time of the disaster, the community is more susceptible and falls under the government's help. The community anticipates the management to convene their short-term physical and financial needs. They also look forward to backing in the year after the disaster; they want to assist with material disruptions, health problems, and psychosocial trauma. According to Reich (1991) and Kletz (1994), sufferers of disasters are organized and voiced in realizing these requirements are met. Herein, to assure these leaders may be challenged to sustain government support. Throughout a disaster, leaders may be forced to meet the requirements or withdraw promises made and face severe criticism for doing so. Consequently, that criticism may last for many years after the disaster and negatively impact the leaders' performance.

Most of the time, dealing with a crisis comprises the centralization of guidance and decision-making efforts. This so-called centralization thesis underpins that the public wants a figurehead in charge during times of crisis. At the political-strategic level, efforts to radically centralized decision-making authority tend to cause more friction than resolve because they disturb well-established authority patterns. Moreover, centralization is nearly impossible at the operational response level because many dynamic, situation-specific, and urgent problems arise simultaneously at different places and nodes in the response network (Benini, 1999). According to Flin (1996), successfully managing change in disaster management is handled adequately by operational leaders with sufficient mandate to take the necessary actions.

According to Sara (2011), elements of drought management like preparedness, mitigation, and reliefs are coordinated and monitored by managers in the area interlinked with the development. Effective planning must consider the relationship between disasters and development to avoid setbacks. Working with full potential for disaster prevention, preparedness, and recovery programs provides significant

opportunities to initiate long-term development programs that reduce drought vulnerability.

Management of droughts necessitates preparation actions, contingency plans that supplement the timely accomplishment of lessening measures and predict impacts that are likely to be practised once the drought becomes recognized and progressed. It means taking into consideration the risk in policymaking and effective monitoring and early warning systems. On the other hand, this comes true where the community has strong institutions and where community participation forces policymakers to adopt drought risk policies and make the society resilient to Drought (Wilhite, 2005).

### **3. Methodology**

This study was carried out in the Borana zone, southern Ethiopia. Borana zone is selected for the study because of aridity and recurrence of drought in the area. Thus, the mainstay livelihood in Borana is pastoralists.

The study used non-probability sampling techniques. From non-probability sampling, the purposive sampling design was used to select a representative sample for the study. In research from Palinkas et al. (2013), purposeful sampling is widely used in qualitative research to identify and choose information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest. Thus, this study aims to understand the perception of managers regarding challenges in drought intervention. Afan Oromo is a working language in the Oromia region so that the interviews were conducted in Afan Oromo. All interview voices were recorded and later transcribed verbatim in Afan Oromo, then translated to English. For anonymity, participant's responses are represented by the letter and number. The types of interviews were semi-structured. It helps detail an in-depth understanding of the experience and phenomenon under study.

The qualitative analysis herein was followed the thematic analysis method manually. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Following different steps, done thematic analysis executed. First steps, familiarizing with data that comprise data transcription, reading and re-reading, noting down initial ideas. The second step was, generating initial codes done through interesting coding features of the data systematically across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. The third steps were to review themes by taking assembling codes to potential themes. The fourth step was defining and naming themes refining each theme's specifics, generating a clear definition and names. The last steps were producing a report selection of vivid, compelling examples, the final analysis of selected extracts, relating the analysis to the research question and literature, and producing the analysis reports.

Data collected with key informant interviews. Thus, 15 (fifteen) purposively selected key informants participated in the study. The study employed an exploratory research design of qualitative approaches. All participants are government officials and non-government organization leaders participating in the disaster risk management task force—fifteen (15) high-profile personalities selected for key informant interviews. The interview took 50-70 minutes to conduct and cover the depth and breadth of the inquiry. The time range that interviews carried out was from January 1/2021 to April 16/2021.

In addition to this, to ensure validity, the researchers spent a prolonged time studying to understand the study area in-depth. Moreover, to strengthen the validity, the researcher used an external auditor to review entire research activities. The external auditor ensured the accuracy of transcription, the relationship amid objectives' and data and levels of data analysis from side to side interpretation. To ensure reliability, the researcher follows Gibbs (2007) qualitative reliability procedures. The researchers provide to check the transcription to do not contain apparent mistakes during transcription. In addition to this, the researchers ensured that there is no flow and shift of codes during codes. The researcher compared data with codes and takes memos about a code.

The majority of the informants are male, 11 (73%), while the 4(27%) are female. Regarding the educational level of the informant's majority, 8 (53%) have MA/MSc, 5(33%) of them have BA/BSc, 1(7%) informant has Ph.D., and 1(7%) informant is a Ph.D. candidate. Regarding the age of the informants, 6 (40%) are 30-42 age group, 4(26.6) of them are 56 years and above, 4(26.6%) of them are from age 43-55, the rest 1(6.6%) is from 18-29 age group. Regarding the job experience of the informant's majority, 12(80%) of them are working above ten (10) years on the position, the rest 3(20%) serves below ten(10) years in the position. Concerning the organizational position, 7(46.6) are Head's, 5(33.3) of them are program or project coordinators, 2(13.3%) are deputy head's, and the rest 1(6.6%) is Advisor.

#### **4. Results**

Leaderships are key bodies expected to act in every drought phase and curb the impacts of drought disasters; whenever dealing with drought, leadership faces challenges. The interviewees asked about the challenges facing them at every level while dealing with drought. Challenges facing them in disaster management are identified below.

##### **4.1 Lack of Strategic Planning**

Since drought is recurrent in the Borana pastoralist area, leadership can describe the situation. Drought has cycles and phases to be managed. The scenarios made the drought not haphazard like other natural disasters. The majority of interviewees (93%) said that disaster management's most vital challenges are proactive planning for the vulnerable community. Lowland Pastoralist area situation very unique and demands certain circumstances. For instance, modes of education, type of health facilities needed, type of extension mechanism needed, land administration are not similar to central highland areas. Addressing drought disaster risk management in the lowland area of pastoralist demands pastoralist centered planning to supplement this idea; interviewee BR001 explained that, 'Borana pastoralist is mainly vulnerable due to recurrent drought, though this problem is well known among the leaders in this area; there are no proper strategic plans that address it.'

The interview BR004 also added that 'When I begin from the origin, leadership did not become fully aware of this changing situation in our area. It means we are managing the community, not as drought-prone areas. However entire planning, mobilizing situation,

and even ecological calendar we are using are the same with central highlanders of Ethiopia. Top management at a different level handicapped to plan according to pastoralist context. In addition to this, drought recovery phases were not managed strategically; instead, they depended on rainfall in the pastoralist area.' (BR004)

The interviewee participants explained the necessity of the strategic plan, but they said that officials at federal and regional governments are not aware of pastoralist areas' characteristics. Most of the time, the central government focuses on agriculture; even the pastoralist development coordination commission at the regional level did not have a mandate to intervene in the pastoralist development issues .because the commission was mandated under the jurisdiction of the Oromia Agricultural bureau. Most of the strategic planning in pastoralist areas was about the plantation, not animal production. Lack of Strategic planning is hampering the regions from producing market-oriented animal production.

#### **4.2 Untimely Response**

Another challenge of drought management is the lack of timely Response to Drought. The majority (93%) of the respondents agreed that most drought interventions in the Borana pastoralist area late. A government official is very bureaucratic by following the procedures while drought causing damages they stick to principles. Most of the time, the government did not believe in the disasters until many people suffered. For example, during drought-hit Borana during 2011, the government intervenes after more than 200,000 cattle deaths and malnutrition occur, likewise with the 2016/2017 drought that cost immense livestock lives. Many lives saved suppose the problems addressed before. Therefore timely response is a tremendous challenge in the pastoralist area. To boost this notion, interview BR003 explained that 'This means even though the forthcoming consequence of drought is vividly known responses like emergency projects and other resources to rescue people's and livestock lives comes after much loses registered.'

The above interviewee found that disasters cost a lot in the Borana pastoralist area because of the response mismatch and aid delivery time. It aligns with the inadequacy of leadership commitment in the area.

#### **4.3 Integration Development to Disaster Risk Reduction**

The majority (67%) of the interviewees felt that drought disaster management is a highly complex task that deserves the collaboration and integration of different stakeholders. One interviewee, BR007, mentioned that 'in my view, drought management coordination is only limited to an emergency when the society at crisis rather than at every phase of the drought cycle.'

Realizing this is very imperative for every phase of drought management. However, in reality, at the grass-root level, every stakeholder's coordination and integration are only bounded to emergency responses or phrases. In mitigations, less attention is given, but during an emergency, many resources are mobilized.

### **4.3 Lack of Proper communication**

In Borana pastoralist areas, most(67%) interviewees argued that there is a lack of proper communications during the drought on how to screen beneficiaries, when and where food aids should unload, manage the resources, and transfer early warning data.

Interviewee BR0010 explained that 'There is a system to receive early warning data from the woreda level experts every Wednesday. However, this communication channel that passes early warning information from the central government like drought, pest infestation, and locust invasion is not communicated timely. Even during the 2016 drought, government conceals the information up-to-date of registered children's malnutrition.' (BR0010)

As most respondents discovered, during 2016, hay distribution communication channels were deliberately broken to make mischief. As an indication, kebele that the zonal office gave as a priority bypassed, and other kebele selected.

### **4.4 Dependency syndrome**

As the majority (73%) of the interviewee felt, the main aims of disaster management are to rescue people from disasters and help society regain its previous status. In addition to this, the sustainability of drought management includes mitigation banks on strengthening community participation. Contrary to this BR006, as noted, 'Another point that wants to stress is emergency response resources are not preparing the community for work but made the community always ask support from external aid. On top of this, aid causes peoples to do not mobilize and participate in the activities independently.'

According to the above interviewee, emergency response is not well managed to participate and mobilize the community for their own sake. Further, the systems caught up by the attitudinal barrier of the dependency syndrome. Nevertheless, now, the majority (60%) of the interviewees perceived the aid has already eroded that tradition. Furthermore, activities supposed to be done by the community's participation and mobilizations are waiting for external support. Interviewee BR0010 also explained that 'During the rainy season, a good number of the ponds in Borana overflow because of siltation. In addition to this, almost 2/3 of Borana land is covered by unwanted bushes; clearing unwanted bushes for getting good grass demands immense labor, but the community seeks payment for removing the bushes for their cattle.' (BR0010)

Interviewees argued that aid dependency and lack of community participation are the main challenges in the DRM system in the Borana area.

### **4.5 Resource Scarcity and Mismanagement**

Disaster management includes disaster prevention, risk minimization, community rehabilitation, and recovery. Hence, these activities request a considerable resource that should be mobilized and managed well for the sake of the community at risk.

There is some disagreement between respondents on the inadequacy of resources in the Borana pastoralist area for drought disaster management. Respondents(53%) claim that, for instance, the quota of rations given to the PSNP family of per person 15KG



(Kilogram) for six months. 15 K.G. is not enough to secure food, and most of the time, ten family members get screened by five members. It means the other five members share 60KG given to 5 members of the family. Besides this, aid is provided only for six months; for the rest, PSNP beneficiaries may suffer from food scarcity. The as noted by BR005, 'This complicated situation demands abundant resources, but we do not have it in our area because there is a challenge of getting help.'

However, at the same time, another (47%) respondent opposed these ideas and(BR003) said that 'I do not believe inadequacies of resources in the Borana zone are other than especially is the utilization of emergency funds which is very low.' It indicates that there is no clarity on identifying existing resources among the interviewees. It might originate from the absence of a common understanding of the specific fundamental issues. Over and above, even though there is no agreement on resource abundance and inadequacy, mismanagement of resources intended to minimize the risk of disaster is vivid. One of the project coordinators portrayed that, 'Issues of selling aid for the personal purpose were prevalent in woredas like Guchi and Wachile. Sometimes misusing of the aid is practicing in pocket areas.' Even many respondents believed hays that were trucked to the pastoralist area get misused. Contingency funds PSNP also very vulnerable for irresponsible officials that use the projects for their benefit.

#### **4.6 Centralization**

Decentralization determined that local level administration could respond to issues at hand without remaining the channel to receive and implement the activities. The interviewee BR005 said that 'Even if the information is available, there is no response from the regional and federal government without verification by sending the committee. This bureaucracy hangs fire the leaders to decide and respond as much as possible.' According to the above appearance, most interviewees (53%) noted a lack of power and resource at woreda and zonal levels to respond to the drought.

#### **4.7 Benefit Sharing Tradition**

The majority (73%) of interviewees emphasized that in pastoralist areas, rangeland, ways of life are communal. Society's categories are interdependent, especially those who 'have' and 'have not.' Most vulnerable and victimized people are selected for recovery or rehabilitation and benefit like grain, edible oil, seed money, and utensils per month. These people do not trust government intervention and NGOs; instead, they trust people who have and always nearby for them at the time of mess. So, whenever they benefit, they share it with people who have and did not need any external support.

Interviewee BR0013 shares the experience depicted from kebele levels said that 'Most productive safety net (PSNP) beneficiaries receive cash and kind support and share their grain and money with other non-safety net beneficiaries. Their acclaimed safety net aid only lasts for six months throughout the year, but their villagers are always living with them. They can support them in times of difficulties.' (BR0013)

#### 4.8 Inadequate Monitoring and Evaluation

Disaster management is a hazardous activity that lasts long for many years. On top of this, from mitigation to recovery, this system needs close follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation. In this regard, data from most (93%) interviewees show a lack of continuous monitoring evaluation of drought management. Respondents agreed that most of the monitoring and evaluation was on emergency projects, not works of mitigations.

Interviewee BR009 also explained that 'Most water projects like Hadho Nagelle, Dida Jarsa, Bisan Biliqo, Tuqa Qaqallo, and Bokossa-gaale pond not completed as per design because of weak project monitoring and evaluation systems. Quality of the projects with robust monitoring and evaluation, such as PCDP (Pastoralist Community Development Project), was manifest while compared to government-funded projects. During the 2017 drought, in wachille *woreda*, grains supposed to be distributed to the communities before rain season expired in the warehouse. Had it been robust monitoring and evaluation of warehouses, people would not suffer from temporary food gaps.' (BR009)

#### 4.9 Inter-tribal conflict

The majority (87%) of the respondent's interviewees explained that inter-tribal conflict is recurrent in pastoralist areas. According to the respondents, the primary source of the conflict was resource competition. During the period of the dry season, the resource like water and pasture are very scarce. In peripheral areas, the competition of these resources causes this conflict. One of the interviewees explained that 'For instance, the conflicts around *malbe* (Ethio-Kenya) border open rangeland are because of the competition of resources. During the intensely dry season, every tribe in the area wants to use pasture and water for their livestock. Conflict at first may arise from a single herder. Eventually, it may enlarge the tribal conflict. However, after the conflict, even though there were enough pasture and water in this free range, no tribe can access it. Thus conflict is the main challenge for pastoralist livelihood systems.' (BR0011)

Contrary to the abovementioned arguments, others (13%) interviewees felt that inter-tribal conflicts emanate from poor and unfair governance around border areas, for instance BR0015 argued that 'Another conflict that continued more than three decades is caused by land claiming for the Gari Tribe. That potential range like udat, malka mari, el-horbi, matawoyama, matarba, urgo, siminto, kojowa, Gofa, lahe was once potential rangeland for Borana pastoralist. Currently, because of the conflict, accessibility to use grazing land was restricted.'

### 5. Discussion

Leaders should make sure that the entities they lead prepared to rise to the future challenge (Trainor, 2013). Exploration of challenges has policy implications to enable the government structures to know pitfalls and give suitable correction mechanisms. Ethiopian lowland pastoralist area situation is unique and demands certain circumstances. For instance, modes of education, type of needed health facilities, type of required extension mechanisms, land administration are not similar to central highland areas.

Most of the strategic planning in pastoralist areas was about the plantation, not animal production. Lack of strategic planning is hampering the regions from producing market-oriented animal production. In this regard, the Borana zone Pastoralist Development Office (2019) indicates that almost all woredas have inadequate contingency planning and long-term drought management plan. This study reveals the challenges of inadequate planning and strategizing for sustainable drought disaster public emergency management. Consistent with this, Behnke, Mcpeak, and Gemechu (2010) noted that while periodic drought is a regular and predictable event in the most lowland area, officials usually treat it as an abnormality, not include it in the ongoing planning and budget process.

Furthermore, response delays are a significant challenge to rescue and manage the risk of drought. It implies that, to curb the drought disaster in pastoralist areas, understanding sustainable pastoralism characteristics and incorporate them in strategic planning benefit the systems is more than necessary. To substantiate this, James & Wooten (2004) argued that public leadership with some realistic planning and expectation might be better positioned to stop some disasters and better ready to manage avoidable people.

Government officials are very bureaucratic by following the procedures while drought causing damages. Most of the time, the government did not recognize the disasters' occurrence until many people suffered. For example, during drought-hit Borana in 2011, the government intervenes after more than 200,000 cattle deaths and malnutrition occur likewise with the 2016/2017 drought cost immense livestock lives.

Disaster intervention is better implemented in an integrated manner with development plans and programs. They followed relief interventions to rehabilitate affected people and reduce future disaster risk and vulnerability (FDRE, 2013). Consistent with this, a Mera concluded that many aid agencies mainly participate in emergencies, and their primary mission is humanitarian assistance. It is necessary to view their mission and commit them to end cyclic emergencies and supporting sustainable development (Mera, 2018).

Proper communication during a drought disaster is the central role of leadership at every level. As discussed in the literature parts, People who communicate well will succeed in leadership posts (Lee and king, 2001). Contrary to this, in Borana pastoralist areas, most interviewees argued that there is a lack of proper communications during the drought on how to screen beneficiaries, when and where food aids should unload, manage the resources, and transfer early warning data. One can conclude from this as a lack of communication hindering drought disaster management. It implies that leadership in the area is not using communication tools for bringing enviable change.

Nevertheless, other research also indicated that communication with citizens and between organizations is credible during a disaster. It is also one of the most sources of problems, as communication often breaks down or becomes overloaded within the midst of a disaster (Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk, 2014). However, primarily previous study communication challenges were extreme events like hurricanes and earthquakes. Current research explores the existence of communication challenges in drought disasters.

It can be inferred that successful disaster management ensures the community's sustainability and readiness is unrealistic without ensuring community participation and mobilization. In addition to this, community aid injection by the name of disaster creates high dependency in the community. Borana community has a tradition of carrying out complex and intensive works formerly Long ago, Borana excavated ponds and wells by hand. Right now, people expect each work to get done with the money. Even they prefer to get paid for their works, such as rangeland management. This finding is apparent with Acaye (2015), who argues that future food aid comes up with an attitude of dependency syndrome on beneficiaries. Andersen et al. (2007) and Limodio (2011) also affirmed that long-term relief aid would lead to reduced productivity, keep people in poverty and the long run make them dependent on external relief aid.

Contrary to this finding, Harvey & Lind (2009) concluded that dependency syndrome is not a direct negative result of relief aid food distribution but relief administration ways. Additionally, Siyoum, Hilhorst & Van Uffelen (2012) concluded that food aid was not the cause of chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia. But this study was done on the northern part of the country and agrarian society PSNP beneficiary only. Current study results are based on the pastoralist livestock herding community in southern Ethiopia. But based on empirical findings in the Borana pastoralist area, relief aid is changing the community behaviors and discourage initiation of the communities towards productive labor works such as rangeland management, pond, and wells rehabilitations.

For instance, Respondents claim the quota of rations given to the PSNP (productive safety net program) family per person 15KG (Kilogram) for six months. 15 K.G. is not enough to secure food, and most of the time, ten family members get screened for only five members. It means that the other left five members share 60 K.G. given to five (5) family members. Besides this, aid is provided only for six months; for the rest, PSNP beneficiaries may suffer from food scarcity.

Hence, these activities request a considerable resource that should be mobilized and managed well for the sake of the community at risk. Quality human resources are scarce, which means that duplication of function is incredibly wasteful. Capacity limitations include physical office space, equipment, communications including appropriate technology, and other facilities. For example, there is a scarcity of adequate communication facilities to transmit early warning and risk and vulnerability Assessment information (DRMFSS, 2014). Tadele and Bernard Manyena (2009) argued that some woreda structures had been hampered by budget resource allocation and inadequate trained human resources. Tadesse et al. (2018) also indicated that lack of financial resources is one of the main challenges of disaster risk management. Darden (2019) elaborated that during the 1985 famine, economic aid such as food aid was diverted to the military purpose and resettling men from the north-central highland to other areas. It implies that if a resource intended to curb the impacts of drought is misused, appropriate interventions could be blurred.

Decentralization enables local leaders to exercise their roles and made them accountable. Decentralization is not only of the mandate but also of resources, and decentralization of the management and resources enables the system effectively. In Ethiopia, most of the resources centralized to the federal government. It affects timely

responses and also proper evaluation. According to the above appearance, most interviewees noted a lack of power and resource at woreda and zonal levels to respond to the drought. Consistent with this finding, that the mandate and power given to the zonal woreda level leaders are very limited on disaster management.

Over and above, one can infer from this lack of decentralization adversely playing for the system's unsuccessfulness. So this might challenge the existing systems on information sharing during drought, appeal procedure, and resource disbursements. We found this old notion of command-and-control during disaster incidents indicate may be beneficial for further policy implementation to strengthen local disaster risk governance. The literature discussion argues that centralization is near impossible at the operational response level because many dynamic, situation-specific, and urgent problems arise simultaneously at different places and nodes in the response network (Benini, 1999). Nguyen and Shaw (2011) concluded that drought early warning, drought forecasting, drought preparedness, and drought response must be decentralized and spread among lower levels to substantiate these findings. Since there are existing gaps in implementing DRM at the local level at the provincial level, the central government, an institution platform, is essential for decentralizing the policymaking process. Lastly, Flin (1996) demonstrated that successfully managing change in disaster management is handled adequately by operational leaders with sufficient mandate to require the necessary actions. It implies centralization of resources, information and jurisdictions hamper drought management pastoralist area

From this, one can depict that the benefit-sharing tradition is challenging a drought management program's success. Moreover, it threatens the food security of the people and aggravates poverty. It implies that during drought response, attention is given to resource distribution and resource utilization. Build back better from disaster damages is essential because the goal of disaster response is enabling victims. As the disaster field evolves from extinguishing the fire to proactive disaster resiliency, focus on beneficiaries' resource utilization enables better understanding. Since this new finding on benefit-sharing benefits sharing, further research may be needed to benefit-sharing linkage with food security among aid beneficiaries.

Up to the end, the findings of this study have a consistency which discussed in the literature, which emphasized on 'despite the prevalence of drought in pastoralist area early warning of disaster management does not coordinate well' (Solomon & et al., 2008). It implies that realizing proper monitoring of ongoing projects, programs, and activities hampers the system. Disaster management is a hazardous activity that lasts long for many years. On top of this, from mitigation to recovery, this system needs close follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation. In this regard, data from most interviewees show a lack of continuous monitoring evaluation of drought management. The public manager's role is to ensure that every disaster-related project is doing according to the intended plan.

Competition over the resources undermines pastoralist risk management strategies due to conflict among pastoralists (WISP, 2015). Resource and land-linked conflicts starting from simple misunderstandings to livestock rustling and kidnapping are now ordinary. Petite disputes escalate quickly and end in the displacement of whole communities and

deaths. Conflicts confine pastoralists to specific areas, resulting in the overuse of nearby resources, which successively causes rangeland degradation (PFI et al., 2010). Violent conflict and fragility are the main challenges in most African countries' cross-border areas, especially in the cross-border regions of Ethiopia and Kenya (Kumssa, 2019). It implies that resource scarcity-induced and border (politician) induced conflicts affect the community's resilience to drought. Conflicts induced migration and livestock as well as human loss. Where there is no instability, mitigations, preparedness, response, and recovery to drought disaster will stick.

## 6. Conclusion

First, this paper aimed to identify the challenges encountering by public managers. Most of the researches in these areas focused on the impacts of drought and coping mechanisms. The unlikely current study particularly highlights public managers' perception of challenges in handling drought in pastoralist areas. The results find that major challenges are inadequate strategic planning, untimely response, integration disaster risk to development, lack of proper communication, benefit-sharing traditions, centralization, dependency syndrome, resource scarcity and mismanagement, inadequate monitoring and evaluation, inter-tribal conflict.

This research has an essential contribution to the public management and drought risk management literatures in introducing views from leadership dimensions. Understanding these challenges and difficulties in low-income countries like Ethiopia could help policy implementations and leadership development toward resiliency. This research has a limitation for using on key informants interviews. The study suggested that future research may use mixed methods besides focusing on remedies to drought disaster governance challenges.

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